Chapter 6: Torts by Smith, James W.
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law




Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml
Part of the Civil Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Smith, James W. (1974) "Chapter 6: Torts," Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law: Vol. 1974, Article 9.
CHAPTER 6 
Torts 
JAMES W. SMITH* 
§6.1. Legislation: Introduction. Contrasted with 1973, the 1974 
legislative production in the torts area was sparse. The statute of limi-
tations for breach of warranty was increased from two to three years; 1 
certain restrictions on the right of a physician to treat a minor for ve-
nereal disease without parental consent were removed; 2 interest on 
damages was increased from 6% to 8%;3 and the admissibility of 
itemized medical bills in tort actions for personal injury was enlarged 
to include actions for personal injury on a contract theory.4 
§6.2. Warranty actions: Statute of limitations. Section 2-318 of 
chapter 106 of the General Laws provides that lack of privity between 
plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense in any action brought 
against the manufacturer, seller, supplier or lessor of goods to recover 
damages for breach of warranty, express or implied, or for negli-
gence, although the plaintiff did not purchase the goods from the de-
fendant, if the plaintiff was a person whom the manufacturer, seller, 
supplier, or lessor might reasonably have expected to use, consume or 
be affected by the goods. 1 Section 2-318 was amended in 1973 to pro-
vide that all actions under the statute must be commenced within two 
years next after the date of injury. 2 Shortly thereafter the general stat-
ute of limitations provisions for tort actions and actions of contract to re-
cover for personal injury 3 were amended to extend the statute of limita-
tions for these actions from two to three years. 4 This statutory conflict 
was eliminated by a 1974 amendment which provides that all actions 
under section 2-318 shall be commenced within three years next after 
the date of injury or damage. 5 
*jAMES W. SMITH is a Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. 
§6.1. 1 Acts of 1974, c. 153. See §6.2 infra. 
2 Acts of 1974, c. 187. See §6.3 infra. 
3 Acts of 1974, c. 224, §2. See §6.4 infra. 
4 Acts of 1974, c. 442. See §6.5 infra. 
§6.2. 1 G.L. c. 106, § 2-318. 
2 Acts of 1973, c. 750, § 1. 
3 G.L. c. 260, §§ 2A, 4. 
4 Acts of 1973, c. 777, §§ 1, 3. 
5 Acts of 1974, c. 153. 
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§6.3. Minors: Treatment for venereal disease. Section 117 of 
chapter Ill of the General Laws, which authorized a "registered 
physician or surgeon acting under the authority of the department of public 
health"1 to treat a minor for venereal disease without the consent of 
the minor's parents if the minor voluntarily appear~d for such treat-
ment, was amended by chapter 187 of the Acts of 1974 to delete the 
language italicized above. 2 This amendment brings Massachusetts in 
line with other jurisdictions which have allowed nrivate doctors to 
treat minors for venereal disease without parentaJ! consent. 3 It also 
harmonizes this statute with section 12E of chapter 112, which allows 
a minor twelve years of age or over to obtain medical treatment for 
drug dependency without parental consent. 4 
1 
§6.4. Interest on damages. Section 6B of chapter 231 of the 
General Laws, 1 as amended by chapter 1114 of the Acts of 1973,2 
provided for interest on damages for personal i~ury or property 
damage from the date of the commencement of th¢ action. The rate 
utilized was 6% per annum, the figure set out in section 6C of that 
chapter3 in contract actions where no other rate had been established 
by the parties to the contract. Section 6B was amen~ed in 1974 so as 
to provide for interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of 
commencement of the action. 4 
The amendment to section 6B did not indicate whfther the increase 
applied to all actions in progress at the time of thei effective date of 
the statute or only to actions commenced after the effective date of 
the statute. In fairness to defendants in actions in progress at the ef-
fective date of the statute, it seems that either the amendment should 
apply only to actions commenced after the effective date of the stat-
ute, or that the 8% rate apply to actions in progressonly for the time 
period after the effective date of the statute. 
§6.5. Medical bills: Admissibility in evidence. Section 79G of 
chapter 233 of the General Laws1 provided that in 
an action of tort for personal injuries, or for consequential damages 
arising therefrom, an itemized bill for medical, dental or hospital 
§6.3. 1 G.L. c. 111, § 117 (emphasis added). 
2 Actsof1974,c.187. 1 
3 See, e.g., Va. Code Ann., § 32-137(6) (Supp. 1974); see alst:t Smith, Medical Mal-
practice, 1972 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law§ 15.2, at 370. 1 
4 G.L. c. 112, § 12E. See Smith, Medical Malpractice, 1972 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§15.2, at 370. 
§6.4. I G.L. c. 231, § 6B. 
2 Acts of 1973, c. 1114. 
3 G.L. c. 231, § 6C. 
4 Acts of 1974, c. 224, § 1. Chapter 224 also amended G.L. c. 231, § 6C, increasing 
the interest rate in contract actions from 6% to 8% where no other rate had been estab-
lished by the parties to the contract. 
§6.5. I G.L. c. 233, § 79G. 
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services rendered to a person injured, subscribed and sworn to 
under penalties of perjury, by the physician, dentist or authorized 
agent of the hospital rendering such services, shall be admissible 
as evidence of the fair and reasonable charge for services .... 2 
Written notice of the intention to offer such a bill as evidence to-
gether with a copy of the bill must be given to the opposing party or 
his attorney not less than ten days before trial. 
In view of the liberalization in recent years of recovery for personal 
injury on a contract theory,3 the limitation of section 79G to tort ac-
tions was unnecessarily restrictive. The statute was recently held inap-
plicable to an action seeking to recover medical benefits under the no 
fault provisions of section 34A of chapter 90 of the General Laws4 on 
the basis that recovery under a personal injury protection insurance 
policy was a contract action rather than a tort action and that section 
79G was expressly limited to tort actions. 5 
Section 79G was amended in 1974 to encompass actions "of tort or 
contract, or for consequential damages arising therefrom .... "6 This 
amendment also harmonizes section 79G with the new Massachusetts 
Rules of Civil Procedure which have abolished the forms of action. 7 
§6.6. Statute of limitations in legal malpractice caSes. In 
Hendrickson v. Sears, 1 the defendant, an attorney, negligently certified 
to plaintiff, his client, that title to certain real estate was "valid, clear 
and marketable." Relying upon this certification, the plaintiff pur-
chased the property. Nine years later, while attempting to sell the 
property, plaintiff discovered the presence of a recorded easement 
running through the premises. Plaintiff suffered a loss in effecting 
modification of the easement and in the sale of the property and 
commenced an action against defendant in the United States District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts. 2 The district judge, citing a 
1966 Massachusetts decision, Pasquale v. Chandler, 3 allowed de-
fendant's motion to dismiss the action4 on the ground that the limita-
tion period had run. 5 On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
2 Id. 
3 See, e.g., G.L. c. 106, § 2-318. 
4 G.L. c. 90, § 34A. 
5 Barnette v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., (Boston Mun. Ct., App. Div., June 25, 
1974). 
6 Acts of 1974, c. 442 (emphasis added). 
7 See Mass. R. Civ. P. 2: "There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil ac-
tion'." 
§6.6. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 501, 310 N.E.2d 131. 
2 Id. at 502, 310 N.E.2d at 132. 
3 350 Mass. 450, 215 N.E.2d 319 (1966). 
4 Hendrickson v. Sears, 359 F. Supp. 1031, 1032 (D. Mass. 1973). 
5 The federal district judge found that the statute of limitations had run regardless of 
whether the action was classified in tort (2 years-G.L. c. 260, § 2A) or contract (6 
years-G.L. c. 260, § 2). 359 F. Supp. at 1032. G.L. c. 260, § 2A has since been 
amended extending the tort statute of limitations to 3 years. Acts of 1973, c. 777. 
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certified to the Supreme Judicial Court6 the following question: 
Does a client's cause of action against an attorney for negligent 
certification of title to real estate "accrue" for purposes of Mass. 
G.L. c. 260 § 2A at the time the certification was given, at the 
time of discovery of the misrepresentation, or at the time when 
any misrepresentation should reasonably have been discovered? 7 
The Supreme Judicial Court answered the question as follows: 
A client's cause of action against an attorney for negligent certifi-
cation of title to real estate does not "accrue" for purposes of G.L. 
c. 260, §§ 2 and 2A until the misrepresentation is discovered or 
should reasonably have been discovered, which ever first occurs. 8 
The policy considerations underlying the statute of limitations are 
hardly affected by the application of the "discovery" rule9 in 
Hendrickson. It is unlikely that defendant-attorney has been prejudiced 
by the usual vices of time passage such as faulty memories, loss of 
evidence, or loss or death of witnesses. The case is not the same as a 
defendant who is sued for negligence arising out of an automobile ac-
cident which occurred ten years earlier. The absolute repose rule, 10 
on the other hand, may bar recovery before the client ever realizes a 
pecuniary loss from his attorney's negligence. Since much of a 
lawyer's work is designed to achieve long range beneficial results, par-
ticularly in the areas of contracts, real estate titles, and estate plan-
ning, it is not unfair that the attorney and his malpractice insurer as-
sume the financial loss resulting from negligence related to such 
work. 
The result in Hendrickson raises, however, another unrelated prob-
lem. The Court in Hendrickson rejected defendant's argument that 
Pasquale v. Chandler11 was binding precedent that the words "after the 
cause of action accrues" as used in the Massachusetts statutes of limi-
tation mean immediately after the defendant's negligent performance 
and not at the time of discovery of such negligence. 12 Rejection of this 
argument creates an apparent inconsistency not explicable on policy 
grounds: as used in legal malpractice cases these words mean that the 
statute of limitations commences to run when the plaintiff knows or in 
the exercise of reasonable care should know of the lawyer's negli-
gence; as used in medical malpractice cases these identical words 
mean that the statute of limitations commences to run at the time of 
6 See Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. Rule 3:21 allowing such certification. 
7 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 502 n.2, 310 N.E.2d at 132 n.2. 
8 Id. at 509-10, 310 N.E.2d at 136. 
9 Id. at 507-10, 310 N.E.2d at 135-36. 
10 An "absolute repose" rule imposes an outside time limit after which no action may 
be brought, irrespective of when the injury is discovered. See Pasquale v. Chandler, 350 
Mass. 450, 457, 215 N.E.2d 319, 323 (1966). 
11 350 Mass. 450, 215 N.E.2d 319 (1966). 
12 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 508-10, 310 N.E.2d at 135-36. 
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the physician's negligent performance.13 The explanation for this ap-
parent inconsistency lies in the area of statutory interpretation. 
In Pasquale, the Court was asked by plaintiff to rule that the lan-
guage of section 4 of chapter 260 of the General Laws, 14 providing 
that medical malpractice cases must be commenced within two years 
"next after the cause of action accrues" means within two years from 
the time that the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the 
physician's negligence and not from the time of such negligence,l 5 as 
had been previously held. 16 The Court indicated that it might have 
been disposed to reconsider the matter were it not for "recent legisla-
tive history."17 The "recent legislative history" referred to a bill, 
House No. 530,1 8 which would have amended section 4 of chapter 
260 to provide for a discovery rule in medical malpractice cases with a 
five year outer limit. The Senate rejected the bill and adopted instead 
a substitute measure19 which merely increased the statute of limita-
tions in medical malpractice cases to three years but otherwise re-
tained the old language of the statute. The Court in Pasquale pointed 
out that this indicated legislative affirmance of its previous acceptance 
of the Court's interpretation of the word "accrues" in Capucci v. 
Barone. 20 The difficulty is that while Capucci and Pasquale were inter-
preting "accrues" as used in section 4 of chapter 260, the identical 
words in sections 2 and 2A of chapter 260 were interpreted differ-
ently in Hendrickson. 21 Did the legislature really intend these identical 
words in allied statutes to have one meaning when applied to medical 
malpractice cases and a different meaning when applied to legal mal-
practice cases? 
One argument justifying Hendrickson might be that the Supreme 
Judicial Court in Capucci was not interpreting the word "accrues" but 
rather was applying common law to an issue left open by the legisla-
ture, i.e., whether a cause of action accrues when the defendant's 
wrongful act causes harm to the plaintiff or when the plaintiff realizes 
or should realize the existence of the harm. Thus, it was not the rejec-
tion of the "discovery" rule by the legislature that had the compelling 
effect in Pasquale but rather that the legislature had relied upon the 
Capucci common law in enacting a three year statute of limitations in 
13 The federal district judge stated the inconsistency as follows: "There certainly is no 
valid reason why the legal profession should be treated more harshly than the medical 
profession as to the date when their members may successfully bar adverse claims 
under the statute of limitations." Hendrickson v. Sears, 359 F. Supp. 1031, 1033 (D. 
Mass. 1973). 
14 G.L. c. 260, § 4. 
15 350 Mass. at 455-56, 215 N.E.2d at 321-22. 
16 Capucci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 165 N.E. 653 (1929). 
17 350 Mass. at 456, 215 N.E.2d at 322. 
18 Mass. H.R. Doc. No. 530 (1965). 
19 Senate No. 924 (1965), which became Acts of 1965, c. 302. 
20 266 Mass. 578, 165 N.E. 653 (1929), cited in 350 Mass. at 457, 215 N.E.2d at 322. 
21 See text at note 8 supra. 
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medical malpractice cases. To now change this cotnmon law would 
frustrate legislative purpose in medical malpractice' cases, a situation 
not present in Hendrickson. 
A question for future cases is whether the Capucci rule has become 
frozen into section 4 of chapter 260 of the General Laws. No reasons 
exist for perpetuating different rules for legal and medical malprac-
tice cases. If the Capucci rule was not statutory interpretation but 
rather the common law supplementation to a statute, it is submitted 
that the Court should change this common law, particularly since the 
above-mentioned legislative reliance on Capucci has been neutralized 
by recent legislation providing for a three year statute of limitations in 
all tort actions. 22 · 
§6. 7. Liability of builder or contractor for negligence. In 
McDonough v. Whalen, 1 the plaintiff purchase.d a new house from Fred's 
Realty Co., the builder. The septic system for the hquse had been de-
signed by defendant Whalen and constructed by defendant Des Vergnes. 
Six months after the purchase, the lot surrounding the house became 
flooded and sewage from the septic system was found to be flowing over 
the land. After several unsuccessful attempts by Fred's Realty Co. to 
correct the problem, plaintiff brought suit against Fred's Realty Co., 
Whalen and DesVergnes. While the litigation was pending, Fred's Realty 
Co. repurchased the property and plaintiff disco~tinued his action 
against it. The plaintiff suffered $1 ,000 out of po9ket loss from the 
transaction.2 He amended his declaration against tne remaining two 
defendants to seek recovery for that loss and for "gre~t anguish of mind 
and embarrassment." The jury returned a verdict fdr plaintiff against 
both defendants, awarding $1 ,000 for property damage and $4,000 for 
mental anguish. Defendants appealed the denial of their motions for 
directed verdicts to the Appeals Court, which reversed and ordered 
judgment for the defendants. 3 The court concluded that even if a 
builder's liability for negligence could be equated to that of a manufac-
turer, recovery could be had only for personal i~'ury or property 
damage. 4 The court further held that property dama e did not include 
either the lessening of the value of the property becaus the system didn't 
work or the expenditure incurred in attempting to c rrect the system. 5 
On further review, the Supreme Judicial Court held t at the defendants' 
I 
22 Acts of 1973, c. 777, amending G.L. c. 260, §§ 2A. 2B, 4. While this amendment 
increased to three years the statute of limitations for the other torts described in G.L. c. 
260, §4, it did not make any corresponding increase to the three year statutory period 
for medical malpractice. 
§6.7. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 999, 313 N.E.2d 435. 
2 The repurchase price was not disclosed in the record before the Court. Id. at 1001 
n.2, 313 N.E.2d at 437 n.2. Claimed damages included loss of use. of the property. 
3 McDonough v. Whalen, 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 683, 688, 304 N.E.2d 199, 
202. 
4 Id. at 686-87, 304 N.E.2d at 201. 
5 Id. 
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motions for directed verdicts on the counts claiming recovery for mental 
distress were properly allowed but the motions for directed verdicts on 
the counts claiming property damage should have been overruled. 6 
There are three essential points in the McDonough decision: ( 1) the liability 
for negligence of a builder, designer or contractor to persons not in 
privity with him; (2) the meaning of the term "physical damage"; and (3) 
the status of recovery for severe emotional distress caused by negligence. 
On the first point, the Supreme Judicial Court, expressly overruling a 
prior case, Cunningham v. T.A. Gillespie Co., 7 held that with respect to 
negligence, there is no reason to treat the builder, designer or contractor 
of a realty structure any differently from the manufacturer of a chattel; 8 
each is liable for harm proximately resulting from his negligence despite 
the absence of privity between plaintiff and defendant. 9 On the second 
point, the Court rejected the conclusion of the Appeals Court on the 
meaning of physical damage, holding that "the loss of use of the property 
and the depreciation in its value as indicated in part by the cost of repairs 
for the septic system" are within the term "physical damage."10 
On the third issue, the status in Massachusetts of recovery for severe 
mental distress caused by negligence, the Appeals Court had rejected 
plaintiff's claim for such damages on the ground that Massachusetts, 
6 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at lOll, 313 N.E.2d at 443. 
7 241 Mass. 280, 135 N.E. 105 (1922), overruled, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1003-04, 
313 N.E.2d at 438-39. Cunningham applied a rule of nonliability to an independent con-
tractor who had completed and turned over the control of allegedly negligent construc-
tion work he had done on a city sidewalk before the plaintiff was injured. 
8 See Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946), holding the man-
ufacturer of goods liable in negligence for personal injury resulting therefrom despite 
the absence of privity between plaintiff and defendant. Id. at 103-04, 64 N.E.2d at 700. 
This rule was later applied to permit recovery for property damage in Brown v. 
Bigelow, 325 Mass. 4, 88 N.E.2d 542 (1949). 
9 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1004, 313 N.E.2d at 439. If no good reason exists for dis-
tinguishing between liability of a manufacturer and that of a builder for negligence, 
does it not follow that such a distinction is untenable in warranty actions? G.L. c. 106, § 
2-318 imposes liability in warranty (as well as negligence) against the manufacturer, sel-
ler, lessor or supplier of goods, despite the absence of privity between plaintiff and de-
fendant, if the plaintiff was a person whom the manufacturer, seller, lessor or supplier 
might reasonably have expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods. Should a 
statute be enacted so as to impose similar liability upon builders, contractors and 
designers of realty structures? It might be noted that the statute of limitations under 
G.L. c. 106, § 2-318, as amended by Acts of 1974, c. 153, is "within three years next 
after the dale the injury and damage occurs," whereas G.L. c. 260, § 2B, as amended by Acts 
of 1973, c. 777, provides: 
Actions of tort for damages arising out of any deficiency or neglect in the design, 
planning, construction or general administration of an improvement to real prop-
erty shall be commenced only within three years next after the cause of action ac-
crues; provided, however, that in no event shall such actions be commenced more than six 
years after the performance or furnishing of such design, planning, construction or general 
administration. [Emphasis added.] 
Such a statute raises some question of equal protection. See Comment, Limitation of 
Action Statutes for Architects and Builders-Blueprints for Non-Action, 18 Cath. U.L. 
Rev. 361 (1969). 
10 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 999, 1005-06, 313 N.E.2d 435, 440. 
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under the so-called "Spade doctrine," 11 does not allow re~overy for mental 
distress negligently inflicted in the absence of a physic<ltl injury resulting 
from the negligence. 12 The Supreme Judicial Court h~s on several occa-
sions refused to reconsider the Spade doctrine. 13 In McDonough, the Court 
again declined the invitation, 14 but this time justifiably. While there is 
good reason to believe that the Spade doctrine will ultirf1ately be rejected 
by the Supreme Judicial Court, such rejection should occur where the 
defendant's negligent conduct threatens severe physical injury to the 
plaintiff, not merely property damage. Too great a lmrden would be 
imposed were a negligent defendant required to comp~nsate the plaintiff 
not only for property damage but also for the mental distress accompany-
ing such damage. One can only speculate, for example, about the havoc 
such a rule would create were it superimposed on the atitomobile no-fault 
property statute. 15 i 
§6.8. Imperiled trespassers: Duty of ordinary care. In the 1973 
decision Mounsey v. Ellard, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court overruled prior 
decisions and held that the duty owed by the occupier! of property to all 
lawful visitors on the property is that of reasonable care, irrespective of 
whether such visitors are considered business invitees, social invitees or 
licensees. 2 The Court in Mounsey, however, did not exp~nd the lesser duty 
of care owed to trespassers, i.e., the duty merely to !avoid willful and 
wanton conduct. In fact, the Court specified its intent not to apply its new 
ruling to trespassers: 
We feel that there is significant difference in th~ legal status of 
one who trespasses on another's land as opposed to one who is on 
the land under some color of right-such as a licensee or invitee. 
For this reason, among others, we do not believe! they should be 
placed in the same legal category .... The possi~le difference in 
classes of trespassers is miniscule com pared to the others. These 
differences can be considered when they arise in future CGfes. 3 
The 197 4 decision of Pridgen v. Boston Housing Autho'rity4 presented the 
first post-Mounsey case in which a trespasser sought 1 the protection of 
ordinary care. The plaintiff, a young boy, climbed through an escape 
11 See Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897). 
12 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 686 n.3, 304 N.E.2d at 201 n.3. 
13 E.g., Sullivan v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 341 Mass. 216, 168 N.E.2d 80(1960). See 
Skelton v. Massachusetts Elec. Co., 358 Mass. 807, 263 N.E.2d 4~5 (1970), distinguish-
ing Spade. ' 
14 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1009-10, 313 N.E.2d at 442. 
15 G.L. c. 90, § 340. 
§6.8. 1 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 871, 297 N.E.2d 43. Mounsey was tHe subject of a student 
comment in 1973 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.17, at 325. 
2 Id. at 884-87, 297 N.E.2d at 51-52. 
3 ld. at 885 n.7, 297 N.E.2d at 51-52 n.7 (emphasis added). Justice Kaplan, in a con-
curring opinion, disagreed with the exclusion of trespassers from 'the application of the 
new rule. ld. at 896, 297 N.E.2d at 57-58 (concurring opinion). 
4 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 245, 308 N.E.2d 467. 
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hatch in the defendant's elevator and got on the elevator roof. When one 
of his friends accompanying him started the elevator, plaintiff slipped 
and fell into the shaft and was caught on metal brackets extending out 
from the wall of the shaft. Plaintiff's friends notified his mother who 
came over to the building and requested the custodian to help her. 
He responded that there was nothing he could do. She then asked 
him to turn off "the lights" in the elevator shaft, evidently referring to 
the electric power. At this point a policeman entered the building and 
ordered the custodian to turn off "the lights." At a point after she 
had asked the custodian for help but before the policeman arrived, 
plaintiff's ·mother heard the elevator move and heard her son scream. 
The trial judge directed a verdict for defendant on a count charging 
willful and wanton conduct but sent to the jury a count charging 
negligence. 5 In so doing he instructed the jury to determine whether 
the defendant was negligent by reason of anything which it or its em-
ployees did or failed to do after learning that plaintiff had become 
trapped in the elevator shaft. The jury apparently found that the de-
fendant was guilty of such negligence and returned a verdict for 
plaintiff. The trial judge took the verdict under leave reserved and 
later, on motion of defendant, ordered it to be set aside and entered a 
verdict for defendant. 6 
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the direction of the verdict for 
defendant on the count for willful and wanton conduct; 7 it reversed, 
however, the trial judge's entry of a verdict for the defendant under leave 
reserved on the negligence count and reinstated the jury verdict for the 
plaintiff. 8 
The Pridgen decision is significant in three respects: (1) it extends 
Mounsey to include imperiled trespassers as persons to whom reasonable 
care is owed; (2) it overrules previously durable Massachusetts law9 by 
imposing a positive duty on the occupier of land to aid an imperiled 
trespasser; and (3) it demonstrates the significant saving of expense and 
court time by the skillful utilization by the trial judge of the procedure 
now known as judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 10 
Prior to Pridgen, Massachusetts common law imposed no duty on a 
person to render aid to an injured person or one in a position of peril 
unless some special relationship, such as master and servant, 11 existed 
5 I d. at 24 7, 308 N .E.2d at 4 70. 
6 ld. 
7 Id. at 253, 308 N.E.2d at 473. 
8 Id. at 263, 308 N.E.2d at 479. 
9 See note 12 infra. 
10 See Mass. R. Civ. P. 50. While normally this procedure is used to avoid a new trial 
where a close question of sufficiency of evidence is present, the trial judge in Pridgen 
utilized the pre-Mass. Rules of Civil Procedure counterpart of j.n.o.v. to avoid a new 
trial where it appeared that the Supreme Judicial Court was likely to make new law. 
Had the Supreme Judicial Court not made new law, the trial judge's post-trial ruling 
would have been affirmed. When the Court did in fact make new law, it had only to 
reinstate the jury's verdict based upon an ordinary negligence instruction. 
11 See Newman v. Redstone, 354 Mass. 379, 237 N.E.2d 666 (1968). 
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between the parties. 12 Apparently even a business invit~r-invitee relation-
ship did not create a duty to act; 13 nor was it relevant th~' t the plaintiff had 
been injured, albeit non- negligently, by the defen ant's instrumen-
tality.14 While seemingly harsh, the pre-Pridgen no-d ty rule had some 
merit. This is best demonstrated by the fact that under Pridgen's 
broad holding, a trespasser is legally entitled to the assistance which would 
not be his due were he injured while lawfully traversing the public way. 
Pridgen raises many questions with respect to the application of the 
ordinary care standard. Is the landowner required to take any risks, even 
minimal, to satisfy his duty to act? If the landowner, as the result of some 
prior conduct such as overconsumption of alcoholic b¢verages, is unable 
to render assistance, may he be held liable on a findipg that such prior 
conduct was unreasonable? Will the landowner be li~ble if he lacks the 
information or skill of a reasonable person so that he fails to render aid, 
or, while attempting to render aid, does so negligently? I Are distinctions to 
be drawn between residential landowners and busines~ landowners? Are 
all types of trespassers entitled to the same standard of conduct? For 
example, while the careless failure to shut off the electric power might 
render a landowner liable to a child trapped in an elevator shaft, would 
the same degree of carelessness render the landowner liable to a person 
who had entered the land to steal his property? While arguably these 
questions may be subsumed under the question of what constitutes 
reasonable care under the circumstances, more specificity is required. 
As regards the duty to act, the landowner should tle required to take 
minimal risks to aid the imperiled trespasser. All con~uct involves some 
risk of injury to the actor; he may, for example, fall down a flight of stairs 
while going down to shut off the electric power. Such r~sk would certainly 
not excuse non-performance. The landowner, however, should not be 
required to aid the imperiled trespasser where to do so would create a 
substantial risk of serious bodily harm. Further, the trespasser should be 
required to take the private residential landowner as he finds him. He 
should not, for example, have the right to demand that such landowner 
be sufficiently sober in the privacy of his home that he may, without 
substantial risk to his person, go into a swimming ool to rescue the 
trespasser. Nor should the trespasser be in a rosition t demand that such 
a landowner have the information and skil of a rea onable person. As 
12 In Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 301 (1928), the defendant rented a 
canoe to the decedent. The canoe overturned and the decedent, after hanging on to 
the canoe for approximately one half hour and making loud calls for assistance which 
the defendant heard and ignored, was obliged to release his hold, and was drowned. 
The Court held that the defendant was under no duty to aid the decedent and hence 
was not liable in the action. ld. at 76, 160 N.E. at 302. See Lacey v. United States, 98 F. 
Supp. 219 (D. Mass. 1951). Osterlind was expressly overruled in Pridgen. 1974 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 259 n.7, 308 N.E.2d at 477 n.7. 
13 See McClean v. The University Club, 327 Mass. 68, 72, 97 N;E.2d 174, 178 (1951), 
containing dictum that no duty existed on the part of a business invitor to call a doctor 
for its ill invitee. 
14 Griswold v. Boston & M.R.R., 183 Mass. 434, 67 N.E. 354 (1903). Griswold was ex-
pressly overruled in Pridgen. 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 259 n.7, 308 N.E.2d at 477 n.7. 
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regards the private residential landowner in the privacy of his home, the 
trespasser should only be legally entitled to a good faith attempt on the 
part of the landowner to assist him where the landowner is aware of the 
trespasser's peril and where such attempt does not create a substantial risk 
of serious injury to the landowner. 
It does not, on the other hand, seem unfair to impose upon the occupier 
of business property the duty of ordinary care to assist the imperiled 
trespasser, again with the caveat that the attempt does not involve a 
substantial risk of serious bodily harm to the actor. The business occupier 
and his employees should possess the information and skill relative to 
their activities around the business area to be capable of exercising ordi-
nary care. 
The Court's holding in Pridgen goes far beyond what was required to 
answer the question before it. This broad approach is quite similar to that 
taken by the Court in the Mounsey case. In Pridgen the defendant's em-
ployee was in control of the instrumentality which was about to cause 
injury to the imperiled trespasser. Only he, with his knowledge of the 
location of the switch, was in a position by the exercise of due diligence to 
prevent the harm. The nexus, imposing the duty of ordinary care, argu-
ably should have been this control element rather than the negative 
relationship of landowner-trespasser. In fact, a fair rule might impose a 
duty on any person who is in control of an instrumentality which has 
caused, or is about to cause, injury to a third party, to at least make a good 
faith attempt to prevent such injury or render aid, irrespective of where 
such incident occurs. 15 
§6.9. Pain and suffering: Motor vehicle tort cases. Section 6D of 
chapter 231 of the General Laws precludes recovery for pain and suffer-
ing "[i]n any action of tort brought as a result of bodily injury . . . arising 
out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle" 
unless the reasonable and necessary medical expenses incurred are in 
excess of five hundred dollars or unless at least one of five other condi-
tions exists. 1 In 1971 in Pinnick v. Cleary, 2 the Supreme Judicial Court 
15 See L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 220 Ind. 86, 40 N.E.2d 334 (1942) for an applica-
tion of this "control" rule. A department store was held liable for an aggravation of the 
injuries caused when a 6 year old child caught his hand in an escalator under the con-
trol of the defendant store, even though it had been conclusively established that the 
store had not been negligent with respect to the choice, construction, or manner of 
operating the escalator. Id. at 95, 40 N.E.2d at 337-38. 
§6.9. 1 G.L. c. 231, § 6D provides: 
In any action of tort brought as a result of bodily injury, sickness or disease, aris-
ing out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle within 
this commonwealth by the defendant, a plaintiff may recover damages for pain 
and suffering, including mental suffering associated with such injury, sickness or 
disease, only if the reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in treating such in-
jury, sickness or disease for necessary medical, surgical, x-ray and dental services, 
including prosthetic devices, and necessary ambulance, hospital, professional nurs-
ing and funeral expenses are determined to be in excess of five hundred dollars 
unless such injury, sickness or disease (l) causes death, or (2) consists in whole or 
in part of loss of a body member, or (3) consists in whole or in part of permanent 
and serious disfigurement, or (4) results in such loss of sight or hearing as is de-
scribed in [G.L. c. 152, §§ 36(a)-(g)] or (5) consists of a fracture. 
2 360 Mass.-, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971). 11
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upheld section 6D against constitutional attack, em~hasizing that the 
elimination of minor claims for pain and suffering bas~d upon an objec-
tive standard was a necessary corollary to the legislatur~'s attempt, by the 
Personal Injury Protection Statute (No-Fault),3 to reduce motor vehicle 
tort litigation. 4 During the 197 4 Survey year, the c<~tse of Chipman v. 
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority5 raised the issue of whether 
section 6D applies to a plaintiff who is injured as the result of the opera-
tion or use of a motor vehicle under circumstances where she has no 
recourse to "no-fault" benefits. 
The plaintiff in Chipman was injured while boarding defenciant's bus as 
the result of negligence by defendant's servant. In her personal injury 
action she sought and recovered damages for pain jand suffering al-
though she neither had medical expenses in excess! of five hundred 
dollars nor satisfied any of the other five conditions se~ out in section 6D. 
Plaintiff was not covered by any of the provisions of~'fno-fault" because 
neither she nor any member of her household owne a motor vehicle. 
Defendant is exempted from the insurance requireme ts of chapter 90 of 
the General Laws. 6 Further, the "assigned claims plan"7 did not apply 
because plaintiff was not injured by an unlawfully uninsured motor 
vehicle or by a "hit and run" driver or by an out-of-state car. Defendant 
appealed, claiming that section 6D applies in any action of tort arising out 
of the operation or use of a motor vehicle; its terms 
1
do not restrict its 
application to motor vehicle accidents wherein the wrovisions of "no-
fault" are applicable. i 
The Supreme Judicial Court in Chipman held that a p1aintiff who has no 
recourse to "no-fault" personal injury protection ben~fits is not barred 
under section 6D from recovering for pain and s~ffering when the 
uninsured defendant is expressly exempted from the ''no-fault" scheme 
by section 1A of chapter 90. 8 The Court noted that although a person may 
be denied the benefits of the "no-fault" scheme, there is no indication that 
the legislature intended to impose upon her its burdens. The Court 
pointed out that its decision is restricted to the facts of the case. Whether a 
defendantis protected by section 6D in other respects was not then being 
decided by the Court. 9 
3 Acts of 1970, c. 670, §§ 1-4, amending G.L. c. 90. 
4 360 Mass. at-, 271 N.E.2d at 610-11. 
5 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh.-, 316 N.E.2d 725. 
6 G L. c. 90, § lA. 
7 G.L. c. 90, § 34N. 
8 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh.-,-, 316 N.E.2d 725, 729. 
9 It appears reasonably clear that a person who was unable to recover "no-fault" ben-
efits because of a deductible (G.L. c. 90, § 34M) or because the policy excluded recovery 
where the injured person's conduct contributed to his injury in one of the ways listed in 
the definition of "personal injury protection" set out in G.L. c. 90, § 34A (operating 
under the influence of alcohol, etc.), would be bound by the conditions set out in § 6D. 
A closer question is whether a person who is precluded from reco~ering "no-fault" ben-
efits because he is entitled to payments under G.L. c. 152, § 15 (workrpen'scompensation) is 
nevertheless limited by the conditions set out in § 6D in an action a~inst a negligent third 
~~ . 
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The result in Chipman appears correct. Despite the seemingly broad 
language of section 6D, the Court properly considered the section in light 
of its purpose as an adjunct to the "no-fault" statute. In fact, about the 
only point which might have raised doubts on the matter was the total 
physical separation of section 6D (chapter 231 of the General Laws) from 
the "no-fault" statute (chapter 90 of the General Laws). Despite this 
separation, the argument seems compelling that if the legislature in-
tended section 6D to apply even where the injured party has no recourse 
to no-fault benefits, it logically would have made section 6D apply in all 
personal injury cases and not merely in motor vehicle tort cases. 
§6.10. Defamation: Constitutional protection. In New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan,! the United States Supreme Court held that the con-
stitutional guarantees provided by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments2 to the United States Constitution require a rule that 
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for defamatory 
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the 
statement was made with actual malice, i.e., with knowledge that it was 
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The 
New York Times rule was subsequently expanded to cover all public 
figures rather than solely public officials. 3 New York Times was further 
expanded by the 1971 Supreme Court decision Rosenbloom v. Met-
romedia, Inc., 4 which held that the First Amendment protects all dis-
cussion and communication involving matters of public or general 
concern without regard to whether the persons involved are famous 
or anonymous. 5 In Rosenbloom, the Court held that a libel action by a 
private individual against a radio station for defamatory falsehood in 
a newscast relating to his involvement in an event of public or general 
concern could be sustained only on clear and convincing proof that 
the defamatory falsehood was published with knowledge that it was 
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. 6 The 
reason for this shift in focus from "public figure" to "issues of public 
or general concern" was stated by the Court as follows: "If a matter is 
a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less 
so merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some 
sense the individual did not 'voluntarily' choose to become involved." 7 
§6.10. 1 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
2 U.S. Const. amends. I, XIV. 
3 See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Associated Press v. Walker, 
388 U.S. 130 (1967); Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines & Broadcasting, Inc., 392 F.2d 417 
(9th Cir. 1968); Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 
1966). 
4 403 u.s. 29 (1971). 
5 Id. at 43-44. 
6 Id. at 52. 
7 Id. at 43, In the 1974 decision Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 1974 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 693, 311 N.E.2d 52, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the 
First Amendment privilege established in Rosenbloom applies even where the defendant 
has misidentified the plaintiff as the person who was involved in the matter of public 
concern. Id. at 697-98, 311 N.E.2d at 56. The Court in Stone also held that the "reckless 
13
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In the 1974 decision Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 8 th~ Supreme Court 
reexamined Rosenbloom and significantly limited its scope. The 
plaintiff-petitioner in Gertz was an attorney who was representing the 
family of a young man who had been shot and killecl by a policeman. 
The defendant-respondent publishes a monthly rbagazine setting 
forth the views of the John Birch Society. The defendant published in 
its magazine a defam;Hory article about the plaintiff. ln plaintiff's libel 
action against defendant, defendant moved for su~mary judgment 
relying upon the New York Times standard as applied to public figures. 
Defendant claimed that plaintiff could not make a showing of malice 
and submitted the affidavit of its managing editqr which denied 
knowledge of the falsity of the statements in the artlicle and claimed 
reliance upon the author's reputation and the editor's prior experi-
ence with the accuracy and authenticity of the author's contributions 
to the magazine. The trial judge denied the moti~n for summary 
judgment as well as a motion for a directed verdict subsequently 
made. Following a jury verdict for plaintiff, the trial judge entered 
judgment for defendant notwithstanding the verdict, accepting 
defendant's contention that the New York Times sta1dard applied to 
any discussion of public issues without regard to the tatus of the per-
son defamed therein. 9 This conclusion anticipated the holding of the 
United States Supreme Court in Rosenbloom. Petitione~ appealed to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circu t. In the interim 
Rosenbloom was decided. The Court of Appeals a firmed the trial 
judge's entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the basis 
that Rosenbloom required the application of the New York Times 
standard whenever the publication or broadcast was about an issue of 
significant public interest, without regard to the position, fame, or 
anonymity of the person defamed. 10 The United I States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to reconsider "the extent ,of a publisher's 
constitutional privilege against liability for defamadon of a private 
citizen."11 
The modification of the Rosenbloom rule brought about by the Su-
preme Court in Gertz was articulated in the opinion asl follows: 
We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, 
the States may define for themselves the appropri~e standard of 
liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamator falsehood in-
jurious to a private individual. This approach pr vides a more 
disregard for truth or falsity'' standard established in New York TimeJ and Rosenbloom is a 
subjective rather than an objective test. Id. at 699, 311 N.E.2d at 57. The test is not 
whether the information was available which would cause a reasonably prudent man to 
entertain serious doubts as to the truth or falsity of the statement. "To negate the 
privilege the jury must find that such doubts were in fact entertained by the defendant, 
or by the defendant's servant or agent acting within the scope of hisiemployment." Id. 
8 418 u.s. 323 (1974). 
9 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 997, 1000 (N.D. Ill. 1970). 
10 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 801, 805-06 (7th Cir. 1972). 
11 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 410 U.S. 925 (1973). 
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equitable boundary between the competing concerns involved 
here. It recognizes the strength of the legitimate state interest in 
compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputa-
tion, yet shields the press and broadcast media from the rigors of 
strict liability for defamation. 12 
Thus, under Gertz, the New York Times standard applies with respect 
to public officials and public figures while the states are free to estab-
lish the standard for private persons, short of strict liability, where the 
discussion involves a matter of public concern. Such standard will be 
either some degree of negligence or the New York Times standard, 
adopted as a matter of state law. The Court's reasoning in Gertz is that 
most public persons voluntarily assume that role and consequently in-
vite attention and comment; such invitation entails assumption of the 
risk of defamatory comment. Public officials run the risk of close 
scrutiny and the public has a vital interest in their personal attributes, 
which are germane to the fitness of the individual for office. Many 
public figures have become such by thrusting themselves into public 
controversies in order to influence their resolution. The private per-
son has sought no such public scrutiny with its accompanying risk of 
unfavorable comment by the media. Further, the private person does 
not normally enjoy the greater access to channels of effective com-
munication enjoyed by public officials and public figures; rebuttal is 
consequently more difficult. 13 
This modification of Rosenbloom by Gertz was not unconditional. The 
Court held that where liability is established under a standard less 
demanding than the New York Times standard, punitive damages are 
not recoverable and compensatory damages may be had only for "ac-
tual injury."14 The "actual injury" requirement, according to the 
Court, does not limit damages to out-of-pocket loss. 15 The Court de-
scribed recoverable damages as follows: 
Indeed, the more customary types of actual harm inflicted by de-
famatory falsehood include impairment of reputation and stand-
ing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish 
and suffering. Of course, juries must be limited by appropriate 
instructions, and all awards must be supported by competent evi-
dence concerning the injury, although there need be no evidence 
which assigns an actual dollar value to the injury. 16 
Is Gertz a reasonable adjustment of the rights of the private person 
to his good name and the need for a free flow of information in mat-
ters of public concern? Unfortunately, ambiguity in the majority opin-
ion in Gertz precludes a clear answer to the question. The limitation 
12 418 U.S. at 347-48. 
13 Id. at 344-46. 
14 ld. at 349. 
15 ld. at 350. 
16 Id. 
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: 
on recovery of damages to only actual injury seem11 to be a fair com-
promise of competing interests in a non-malicious ublication involv-
ing a matter of public interest. "Actual injury," , owever, requires 
further clarification. While the Court points out ~hat out-of-pocket 
loss is not necessary, and that customary types of harm resulting from 
defamation, such as mental suffering, loss of reputation and standing 
in the community and humiliation are compensable, the Court does 
not clearly answer a critical question: may at least nominal damages 
for loss of reputation be recovered where the statements are defama-
tory on their face, without the necessity of producing either witnesses 
who will testify that they held or now hold the plaiQtiff in less esteem 
because of the defamatory statements or similar eridence? Will the 
victim of public statements, defamatory on their fa~· , who seeks only 
the protection of his good name, be denied judici I vindication be-
cause he can neither produce such evidence nor e tablish malice on 
defendant's part? 17 Confusion on this point stems rom the fact that 
in one portion of the opinion dealing with the damages issue, the 
Court is critical of the traditional rule of libel law whereby the exis-
tence of injury is presumed from the fact of publication. 18 The 
opinion's emphasis then shifts to the idea that states have no substan-
tial interest in securing for plaintiffs gratuitous awards of money 
damages 'Jar in excess of any actual injury."19 This se~ond point, while 
no doubt accurate, is a non sequitur. The non-maltcious defamer of 
private persons deserves constitutional protection ag~inst the recovery 
of excessive damages or damages based upon fictit~ous claims of in-
jury where a matter of public interest is involved!; such protection 
does not, however, require that the one defamed ~e denied the op-
17 The dissenting opinion of Justice White interprets the majority opinion as clearly 
precluding the recovery of nominal damages for a libel, defamatory on its face, without 
such evidence, where plaintiff cannot establish liability on a New York Times standard: 
The impact of today's decision on the traditional law of libel is immediately obvi-
ous and indisputable. No longer will the plaintiff be able to rest his case with proof 
of a libel defamatory on its face or proof of a slander historica Iy actionable per se. 
In addition, he must prove some further degree of culpable c nduct on the part 
of the publisher, such as intentional or reckless falsehood or n gligence. And if he 
succeeds in this respect, he faces still another obstacle; recover for loss of reputa-
tion will be conditioned upon "competent" proof of actual inju y to his standing in 
the community. This will be true regardless of the nature of he defamation and 
even though it is one of those particularly reprehensible state ents that have tra-
ditionally made slanderous words actionable without proof o fault by the pub-
lisher or of the damaging impact of his publication. The Court rejects the judg-
ment of experience that some publications are so inherently capable of injury, and 
actual injury so difficult to prove, that the risk of falsehood should be borne by the 
publisher, not the victim. Plainly, with the additional burden on the plaintiff of 
proving negligence or other fault, it will be exceedingly difficult, perhaps impossi-
ble, for him to vindicate his reputation interest by securing a judgment for nomi-
nal damages, the practical effect of such a judgment being a JUdicial declaration 
that the publication was indeed false. 
418 U.S. at 375-76 (dissenting opinion). 
18 Id. at 349. 
19 Id. (emphasis added). 
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portunity to restore his reputation by a recovery of nominal damages 
simply because no witness testifies that he held such person in lower 
esteem because of the libel. The point needs clarification. Further, 
where only nominal damages are sought, as in cases where plaintiff is 
only attempting to save his reputation, it is unnecessary to impose 
even a negligence standard. A sensible compromise would allow plain-
tiff to recover nominal damages for loss of reputation on a strict liabil-
ity standard and allow recovery of damages for such items as mental 
suffering on a state-established standard short of strict liability. 
STUDENT CoMMENT 
§6.11. Defamation: Use of extrinsic facts in publication innocent 
on its face: Need for proof of special damages: Sharratt v. Housing 
Innovations, lnc. 1 John Sharratt Associates, Inc., of which registered 
architect John Sharratt is the principal stockholder, entered into a 
written contract with the Lower Roxbury Development Corporation2 
to design a project known as "Madison Park Houses." The firm of 
Samuel Glaser and Partners was named as an associate architect.3 De-
fendant Housing Innovations, Inc. was named a consultant on this 
project4 and two of its employees put together a promotional 
brochure which stated that the [a]rchitects for the Madison Park proj-
ect are Samuel Glaser and Partners."5 There was no mention of John 
Sharratt Associates in the brochure. 
Sharratt and his company brought an action in superior court for 
libel against Housing Innovations, in which Sharratt alleged that the 
brochure, by failing to identify him as the principal architect of the 
project, was false and defamatory. He claimed that the false identifica-
tion of Samuel Glaser and Partners as the sole architect attacked his 
veracity and credibility since he had informed those with whom he 
had business dealings that he was the architect for Madison Park. 
Consequently, his standing as an architect was impaired. 6 General 
damages were alleged, but no special damages were claimed. 7 The de-
§6.11.' 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 575,310 N.E.2d 343. 
2 Id., 310 N.E.2d at 344. 
3 Id. 
• Brief for Appellant at 2, Sharratt v. Housing Innovations, Inc., 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
575, 310 N.E.2d 343. 
5 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 576, 310 N .E.2d at 345. 
6 Id. at 579, 310 N.E.2d at 346. 
7 General damages necessarily or usually follow from the facts alleged as a cause of 
action, and thus need not be claimed in the complaint beyond a bare statement of 
amount in order to be proven and recovered at trial. The jury is permitted to decide 
the amount to be awarded without any evidence as to amount having been introduced. 
Special damages must be specifically claimed and described if recovery for them is to be 
allowed, and must be pecuniary in nature. See generally C. McCormick, Handbook on 
the Law of Damages § 8, at 32-33 (1935); W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 
112, at 754, 760 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Prosser). 
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fendants demurred on the ground that the complaint failed to state a 
cause of action. 8 The superior court sustained the demurrer, holding 
that the statement in question was not defamatory, and that even if 
the statement were defamatory, it was libelous "per quod" since it was 
innocent on its face, and in such a case the complaint must allege spe-
cial damages to withstand demurrer. 9 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed and held that a statement in-
nocent on its face may be proven to be defamatory through the use of 
extrinsic facts. 10 The Court reasoned that in view of the well-
established common law principle that a plaintiff in a libel action may 
introduce in the pleadings the circumstances surrounding an ambigu-
ous statement in order to show that the statement was understood in a 
defamatory sense, it would be unfair to deny another plaintiff the 
same opportunity merely because the words alleged to be defamatory 
appear to be innocent to the general public, even though they were 
clearly understood to be defamatory in a particular community. 11 
Concluding that the distinction between libel per se and libel per 
quod is irrelevant to the issue of pleading special damages, the Court 
further held that all libel is actionable per se. 12 Thus, Sharratt elimi-
nated the requirement of pleading special damages in a case of libel 
per quod. 
This casenote will take the position that the Supreme Judicial Court's 
refusal to adopt the narrow and rigid view of libel per quod urged by the 
defendants represents an enlightened approach to the law of libel, and 
8 Under the new Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, which went into effect on 
July 1, 1974, the demurrer has been replaced by a motion for judgment on the plead-
ings under Rule 12(b)(6) and (c). Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), (c). 
9 A complaint in a tort action alleging special damages contains an allegation of the 
facts which constitute the tort and a recital of the consequences of those acts which are 
the basis for the special damages. This list of consequences is preceded by the phrase 
"per quod" from the Latin "whereby," as in "whereby the plaintiff suffered damage in 
such and such .... " Sometimes the phrase is used simply as the name of that clause of 
the declaration, or, as in the case of libel per quod, is incorporated into the name of a 
cause of action which requires proof of special damage. See Black's Law Dictionary 
1293-94 (4th ed. 1968). 
10 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 578, 310 N.E.2d at 346. The Court reasoned that the facts 
pleaded tended "to show that [the statement in the brochure that Samuel Glaser and 
Partners were the architects for the project] ... could be understood as referring to the 
plaintiff," in spite of the objections of the appellees that no Massachusetts case recog-
nized such a right to recover for silence as defamation. Id. at 579, 310 N.E.2d at 346. 
The Court pointed out that extrinsic facts could be used to show drat the statement re-
fers to the plaintiff. Other jurisdictions have argued that "words spoken of and con-
cerning one person may be capable of conveying a defamatory meaning about another 
person." 1 F. Harper & F. James, Jr., The Law of Torts § 5.7, at 366 (1956) 
[hereinafter cited as Harper & James] and cases cited therein. See, e.g., Cassidy v. Daily 
Mirror Newspapers, Ltd., [1929] 2 K.B. 331 (C.A.), in which a picture of plaintiffs 
husband with a Miss X and an announcement that they were engaged, when published 
in a newspaper, was held to libel the plaintiff since her neighbors could infer from it 
that she and her husband were not actually married. Id. at 340, 355. 
11 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 579, 310 N.E.2d at 346. 
12 Id. at 581, 310 N.E.2d at 347. 
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that the Court correctly decided to allow the introduction of extrinsic facts 
to show the libelous nature of a statement innocent on its face. It will then 
discuss the Court's abolition of the requirement that special damages be 
pleaded in libel per quod actions, and the effect on this aspect of the 
decision of the recent United States Supreme Court case of Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc. 13 in light of the current application of the commercial speech 
doctrine in libel cases. 
The first issue faced by the Court was whether extrinsic facts can be 
applied to render an apparently innocent publication libelous, or 
whether they can only be used to interpret an already ambiguous 
publication. 14 The alleged libel at issue in Sharratt, the statement that 
the "[a]rchitects for the Madison Park project are Samuel Glaser and 
Partners,"15 was conceded to be a publication innocent on its face. 
The defendants pointed out that allegations of libel per quod had 
been sustained in previous Massachusetts decisions only in those in-
stances in which the publications at issue were capable of two 
meanings-one innocent, one defamatory16-without reference to ex-
trinsic facts. Although there was no authority directly on point, the 
defendants urged that this prior related case law be interpreted to 
preclude the application of a libel per quod theory to a publication 
which, absent reference to extrinsic facts, is capable of only an inno-
cent meaning. 17 The defendants' argument appears to have been 
based, however, solely on the happenstance that in prior Mas-
sachusetts cases of libel per quod the statements at issue were am-
biguous on their face. 18 Furthermore, the defendants did not argue 
13 418 u.s. 323 (1974). 
14 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 577,310 N.E.2d at 345. 
15 Id. at 576, 310 N.E.2d at 345. 
16 Id. at 577, 310 N.E.2d at 345. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. The cases cited in Sharratt provide a good illustration of the basis for the de-
fendants' assumption. In Lyman v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 286 Mass. 
258, 190 N .E. 542 (1934), the Court said: "If the words of a libel are clearly defama-
tory, no innuendo is necessary; if incapable of a defamatory meaning, innuendo will not 
make them so; but if reasonably susceptible of two or more meanings, one of which is 
defamatory, an innuendo may be necessary." Id. at 261, 190 N.E. at 543. The defen-
dants in Sharratt argued that this language indicates that a publication must at least be 
ambiguous on its face to be actionable. However, it has always been clear that an "in-
nuendo," the statement in the complaint of the alleged defamatory meaning of the pub-
lication, cannot add a defamatory meaning not already present, but this meaning which 
is present can be inferred from both the publication and the extrinsic facts known to 
the reader (which are set forth in the inducement). See generally Harper & James, 
supra note 10, § 5.9, at 373; M. Newall, Slander and Libel·§ 252, at 291 (4th ed. 1924); 
W. Odgers, A Digest of the Law of Libel and Slander 109 (6th ed. 1929); Prosser, supra 
note 7, § Ill, at 749. This would seem to imply that the real question is whether the 
statement is ambiguous in light of the extrinsic facts. A case which might be cited for 
this more liberal position is Ingalls v. Hastings & Sons Publishing Co., 304 Mass. 31, 22 
N.E.2d 657 (1939), in which the Court said "a demurrer to a declaration in libel cannot 
be sustained, nor can a case be withdrawn from the jury, unless the words ... are in-
capable of a defamatory meaning." Id. at 34, 22 N.E.2d at 659. 
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any sound policy reasons why this happenstance should be hardened 
into common law doctrine. 
It is submitted that the Court correctly decided to allow the intro-
duction of extrinsic facts. Had it held to the contrary, it would have 
overlooked the main purposes of the law of defamation, namely, 
compensation for harm done and restoration of reputation through 
the public vindication of a successful libel suit. 19 A publication is no 
less harmful from the mere fact that, standing alone, it is completely 
innocent if the relevant community understands it as defamatory in 
the light of extrinsic facts. 20 
The second issue faced by the Sharratt Court was whether a plaintiff 
is required to plead and prove special damages in an action for libel 
per quod. 21 Although the Massachusetts law on this issue was unclear 
prior to Sharratt, 22 there was some support from other jurisdictions 
for such a requirement. 23 The Court refused to adopt a requirement 
19 See, e.g., Lyman v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 286 Mass. 258, 262, 
190 N.E. 542, 544 (1934); Prosser, supra note 7, § Ill, at 737. 
20 See 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 579, 310 N.E.2d at 346. 
21 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 576, 310 N .E.2d at 345. 
22 See Ingalls v. Hastings & Sons Publishing Co., 304 Mass. 31, 22 N .E.2d 657 (1939) 
(immaterial whether special damage alleged if publication libelous on its face); Robinson 
v. Coulter, 215 Mass. 566, 102 N.E. 938 (1913) (question whether special damage suffi-
ciently alleged could not be later raised in case where not raised on demurrer); 
McLaughlin v. American Circular Loom Co., 125 F. 203 (lst Cir. 1903) (letter suscepti-
ble of defamatory meaning is actionable if special damage is alleged and proved). 
23 See, e.g., cases collected in Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 Va. L. Rev. 839, 846-47 nn. 
45-53 (1960). The authorities are not in agreement on the views of other jurisdictions, 
however. The debate is mainly between Prosser, who believed that the majority of 
jurisdictions now require proof of special damage, and Eldredge, who believes they do 
not. Compare Eldredge, The Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quod, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 733 
(1966) with Prosser, More Libel Per Quod, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1629 (1966), and Prosser, 
Libel Per Quod, 46 Va. L. Rev. 839 (1960). For commentary on this debate, see I A. 
Hanson, Libel and Related Torts 24 (1969); Henn, Libel-By-Extrinsic-Fact, 47 Cornell 
L.Q. 14 (1961); Murnaghan, From Figment to Fiction to Philosophy: The Requirement 
of Proof of Damages in Libel Actions, 22 Cath. U.L. Rev. I (1972); Note, 48 N.C.L. 
Rev. 405 (1970); Current Decisions, 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 580 (1962); Case Comments, 
24 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 139 (1967). 
The Restatement (First) of Torts § 569, at 166-67 (1938) states the traditional rule: 
One who falsely, and without a privilege to do so, publishes matter defamatory 
to another in such a manner as to make the publication a libel is liable to the other 
although no special harm or loss of reputation results therefrom. 
Dean Prosser, as Reporter, sought to have the Restatement changed to read as follows: 
(I) One who publishes defamatory matter is subject to liability without proof of 
special harm or loss of reputation if the defamation is (a) Libel whose defamatory 
innuendo is apparent from the publication itself without reference to extrinsic 
facts by way of inducement, or (b) Libel or slander which imputes to another (i) A 
criminal offense, as stated in§ 571, (ii) A loathsome disease, as stated in§ 572, (iii) 
Matter incompatible with his business, trade, profession or office, as stated in § 
573, or (iv) Unchastity on the part of a woman, as stated in § 574. (2) One who 
publishes any other defamation is subject to liability only upon proof of special 
harm as stated in § 575. 
Restatement of Torts§ 569, at 83 (Tent. Draft No. II, 1965). Due in part to the con-
troversy, the change was not then adopted. In 1966 a compromise solution was tenta-
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of proof of special damages; it held instead that plaintiffs in cases of 
both libel per se and libel per quod can recover presumed damages.24 
It is submitted that this decision was correct because there is no con-
vincing reason to recognize a distinction between libel per se and libel 
per quod in regard to damages. The reasons hypothesized by various 
commentators for the development of the distinction in other jurisdic-
tions do not withstand analysis. 
One such reason is judicial confusion with regard to the meaning of 
per se. In the law of slander, per se meant that the publication fell 
into a particular category of defamation so heinous that damages were 
presumed to result.25 The label in no way related to whether extrinsic 
facts were needed to make out the defamatory meaning of the publi-
cation. Slander that did not fall into one of the "per se" categories re-
quired that special damages be pleaded and proven, regardless of 
whether the publication was defamatory on its face or only in light of 
extrinsic facts. Some courts did not understand this use of "per se" 
and indiscriminately added this damage-related meaning to its "mean-
ing on face" use in libel. 26 A second reason suggested is confusion be-
tween injurious falsehood, which requires proof of damage, and 
libel. 27 
A third and more substantial reason hypothesized for the develop-
ment of the requirement of proof of damage in libel per quod cases is 
that libel per quod is more like slander than libel in that the extrinsic 
facts are generally not published in the same way as the libel, but are 
spread by word of mouth.28 They will supposedly be known to rela-
tively fewer people, and therefore the libel supposedly will be less 
likely to do harm.29 However, the actual result is not less likelihood of 
any harm, but rather that the harm is likely to be less extensive. This is 
tively adopted, but in 1967 consideration of all sections on defamation was deferred be-
cause of the changes in the law being made by the Supreme Court during that period. 
In 1974 a major revision of all chapters on defamation took place, in which Eldredge's 
interpretation of the cases was accepted and the original version of § 569 was essentially . 
readopted. To trace the history of this controversy, see Restatement of Torts § 569, at 
83, and notes and commentary, at 83-96 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965); Restatement of 
Torts§ 569, at 29, and notes and commentary, at 29-53 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966); Re-
statement of Torts§ 569, Note, at 1-2 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967); Restatement of Torts 
at xiv, § 569, at 55 and commentary at 55-58, note at 59 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974). 
24 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 581, 310 N.E.2d at 347. 
25 Prosser, supra note 7, § 112, at 754. 
26 Eldredge, The Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quod, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 733, 736 (1966). 
27 Injurious falsehoods need not put the plaintiff in a "bad light," and indeed, can 
even be flattering. Prosser, supra note 7, § 128, at 916. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
require proof of damage because one would not ordinarily expect damage to result 
from a non-defamatory statement. The difference between "injurious falsehood" and 
libel per quod is that in libel per quod the plaintiff must prove that the statement had a 
defamatory meaning. Id. § 111, at 746. 
28 Henn, Libel-By-Extrinsic-Fact, 47 Cornell L.Q. 14, 48 (1961); Prosser, Libel Per 
Quod, 46 Va. L. Rev. 839, 849 (1960). 
29 Prosser, More Libel Per Quod, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1629, 1647 (1966); Prosser, Libel 
Per Quod, 46 Va. L. Rev. 839, 849 (1960); Note, 48 N.C.L. Rev. 405, 411 (1970). 
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necessarily so since once a plaintiff shows that a statement was pub-
lished to third persons who were aware of facts that gave the state-
ment a defamatory meaning, he has proved that some defamation has 
occurred. That the extrinsic facts are spread by word of mouth goes 
to the extent of the defamation, not to its existence. An argument 
could be made that the jury should be able to take this into account in 
assessing damages, but to require the plaintiff to prove special dam-
ages is not appropriate, it is submitted, when at least some damage 
can be presumed from the fact that someone understood the publica-
tion to be defamatory in light of facts known to him. 
Fourthly, it has been noted that judges are disinclined, as a matter 
of policy, to allow a plaintiff a recovery without a showing of harm.30 
The nature of libel, however, is such that real harm may be impossi-
ble to prove and, in particular, may not manifest itself in the financial 
damage which is necessary to claim special damages. 31 Furthermore, 
to require proof of special damage would prevent a libel victim from 
bringing an action to clear his name, even if he wants no money dam-
ages. 
Finally, it has been argued that the requirement of proof of special 
damages is necessary to prevent self-censorship by media publishers 
who might make statements which are innocent in themselves but 
which become defamatory because of extrinsic facts known to the 
reader but not to the publisher. 32 It is submitted that this argument is 
without merit. Self-censorship will not occur unless a publication is 
not innocent on its face or unless the publisher is aware of the extrin-
sic facts since otherwise he would probably not suspect an item to be 
defamatory. 
However, even if Sharratt would have created problems for innocent 
publishers, any such potential problems have been eliminated, at least 
where the media is concerned, by the United States Supreme Court in 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 33 decided two months after Sharratt, which 
established that the damages aspects of cases such as Sharratt cannot 
apply to cases involving freedom of the press. 
Gertz arose out of the defendant's publication of an article in 
American Opinion, an outlet for the views of the John Birch Society, ac-
cusing the plaintiff, an attorney, of being a communist and the ar-
chitect of an alleged "frame-up" of a police officer on murder 
charges. The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who is not a public 
official or a public figure cannot be held to the strict standards of 
proof applied in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 34 and Curtis Publishing 
30 Murnaghan, From Figment to Fiction to Philosophy: The Requirement of Proof of 
Damages in Libel Actions, 22 Cath. U.L. Rev. I, 16 (1972). 
31 Eldredge, The Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quod, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 733, 755 (1966). 
32 See Comment, The Expanding Constitutional Protection for the News Media from 
Liability for Defamation: Predictability and the New Synthesis, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 1547 
(1972). 
33 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
34 376 U.S. 254 (1964). New York Times held that a public official cannot recover for 
libel unless he can prove that the defendant published the defamatory statement with 
knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or-not. 
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Co. v. Butts, 35 but rather that he has a choice.36 He must prove either: 
(1) that the defendant published a defamatory falsehood about him 
with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard for its truth or 
falsity, 37 in which case the plaintiff may recover presumed damages,38 
or (2) that the defendant was ·negligent in publishing the defamatory 
falsehood and that this publication caused actual damage to the 
plaintiff. 39 Any impact which the damages aspect of Sharratt might 
have had on cases deriving from media news stories is thus clearly 
eliminated. 
The question of whether the damages aspect of Sharratt retains any 
vitality depends on whether Gertz is extended to apply to cases not 
based on media news stories. The various opinions in Gertz give little 
support to the likelihood of such an extension. Although the majority 
opinion never says that it is restricting its broad holdings to media 
cases, it does refer to the projected defendants as "publishers and 
broadcasters."4° Furthermore, the concurring opinion of Justice 
Blackmun41 and the dissent of Justice Brennan42 repeatedly refer to 
"the media" when they speak about the interests of possible defen-
dants. Justice White, on the other hand, said in his dissent that the 
decision requires the plaintiff "in each and every defamation action"43 
to prove culpability on the part of the defendant, possibly implying 
that not only media cases are involved. Justice Douglas in his dissent 
did not address this issue, but stated that the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments render all libel actions unconstitutional. 44 The opinions 
of a significant majority of the Court thus support the probability that 
Gertz will not be extended to non-media cases. 
The contention that Gertz does not eliminate the impact of Sharratt 
in non-media cases is strengthened by the way the commercial speech 
doctrine has been applied in non-media libel cases by several of the 
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals. The strict standards applied 
in New York Times and Curtis Publishing Co. were held not to apply in 
those cases. Several of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals 
have drawn distinctions in libel cases between private subscription 
credit reports and other published statements. In Grove v. Dun & 
35 388 U.S. 130 (1967). This case extended the New York Times standard of proof to 
public figures who were not public officials. 
36 418 U.S. at 346. 
37 Id. at 349. This is also known as "New York Times" or "actual" malice. See New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,279-80 (1964). 
38 418 U.S. at 349. Although the Court held that such a plaintiff could also recover 
punitive damages, id., a plaintiff in Massachusetts cannot recover punitive damages in 
actions of libel or slander. G.L. c. 231, § 93. 
39 418 U.S. at 347, 350. 
40 See, e.g., id. at 343. 
41 Id. at 353. 
42 Id. at 361. 
43 Id. at 370. 
44 Id. at 358-60. 
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Bradstreet, Inc. ,45 the Third Circuit held that the defendant's publica-
tion, which was a private subscription credit report, was not entitled to 
the extended constitutional protection of the standard of proof estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in media cases.46 The court felt that 
there was a rational distinction between "a publication which dissemi-
nates news for public consumption and one which provides specialized 
information to a selective, finite audience."47 
The first basis for the court's decision in Grove was its holding that 
the credit standing of a small brick and tile brokerage company was 
not a matter of public interest under Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 48 
The second basis of the court's decision was that such a publication 
was a different kind of medium and hence did not merit such 
protection. 49 
This decision by the Third Circuit has been followed by the Fifth,50 
Seventh51 and Tenth52 Circuits in other cases involving private sub-
scription credit reports. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
pointed out that the second basis for the Grove decision and those 
which followed it really derives from the lesser degree of protection 
given commercial speech53 under the 1942 case of Valentine v. 
Chrestensen. 54 
If these cases are still good law, Gertz probably will not be held to apply 
to cases such as Sharratt when the scope of the publication is limited and 
the publication is a commercial one dealing not with public economic 
policy but with the making of private economic decisions. 55 
45 438 F.2d 433 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 898 (1971). 
46 438 F.2d at 434-35, 437, citing Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 
415 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1969), affd, 403 U.S. 29 (1971). The Supreme Court had not yet 
affirmed Rosenbloom when Grove was decided. 
47 Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 438 F.2d 433, 437 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 
U.S. 898 (1971 ). For a general discussion of this distinction, see Note, First Amendment 
Protection Against Libel Actions: Distinguishing Media and Non-Media Defendants, 47 
S. Cal. L. Rev. 902 (1974). 
48 438 F.2d at 436-37. See also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
49 438 F.2d at 437. 
50 Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 
u.s. 985 (1974). 
51 Oberman v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 460 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1972). 
52 Kansas Electric Supply Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 448 F.2d 647 (lOth Cir. 
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1026 (1972). 
53 Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25, 29 n.5 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 
415 u.s. 985 (1974). 
54 316 u.s. 52 (1942). 
55 See Note, First Amendment Protection Against Libel Actions: Distinguishing Media 
and Non-Media Defendants, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 902 (1974). But see Adey v. United Ac-
tion for Animals, 361 F. Supp. 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 493 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 
1974), in which the district court refused to recognize an exception to First Amendment 
protection in libel of a public official for "private libel." Plaintiff, a scientist and consul-
tant to NASA, sued United Action for Animals (UAA) for allegedly libelous statements 
attacking his character and professional qualifications with respect to his involvement in 
the space program. The statements appeared in a UAA publication mailed to members 
and other specially selected recipients, and was not distributed publicly. 361 F. Supp. at 
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However, there is considerable basis for the argument that these 
decisions may soon be overruled. First, the Supreme Court in Gertz 
refused to follow the most widely-held understanding of its decision 
in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 56 The Court in Gertz held that the 
conditional constitutional privilege given in New York Times and Curtis 
Publishing Co. to a newspaper or broadcaster who publishes a de-
famatory falsehood about a public figure will not be extended to de-
famatory falsehoods about private persons concerning matters of pub-
lic interest. 57 Thus the first basis for the circuit court decisions has 
been eliminated. 
Secondly, there have been Supreme Court cases since Valentine 
which affirm the doctrine giving lesser protection to commercial 
speech, but also seem to call the future viability of that doctrine into 
question. Valentine itself was a short, unanimous opinion upholding an 
ordinance which prohibited the distribution in the streets of commer-
cial and business matter. 58 It contained the bold statement that "[ w ]e 
are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on 
government as respects purely commercial advertising."59 There is no 
mention of why this is so, and no citation to earlier cases. 
Seventeen years later, in Cammarano v. United States, 60 the Court 
held that no First Amendment question was presented by a regulation 
denying a tax deduction for sums expended in the promotion before 
the legislature of measures which would economically benefit the in-
dividual taxpayer doing the promoting.61 Justice Douglas, concurring 
on the grounds that deductions are a matter of grace, not of right,62 
called for a reconsideration of Valentine on the grounds that the First 
Amendment is not restricted to the expression of political ideas and 
philosophical attitudes or to the arts, but rather "comprehends every 
sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and 
opinion. "63 
Later still, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Grove v. Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. ,64 mentioned above. Justice Douglas dissented from this 
458-59, 461. The court distinguished the credit report cases from Adey on the absence 
of confidentiality of the publication in the latter and the ability of Adey to respond to 
the charges against him. ld. at 461 n.10. 
56 418 U.S. at 346. Compare Rosenbloom v Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
For discussions of the various interpretations of Rosenbloom, see Comment, The Expand-
ing Constitutional Protection for the News Media from Liability for Defamation: Predic-
tability and the New Synthesis, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 1547, 1558-80 (1972); Restatement of 
Torts §§ 580, comment c, at 123; 581A, at 134, commentary at 134-40; 581B at 141, 
commentary at 141-45; 613(l)(g) and (h) at 267, comment g at 269; 618 at 280, com-
mentary at 280-81; 621 comment b, at 286 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974). 
57 418 U.S. at 346. 
5 • 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
59 Id. at 54. 
60 358 U.S. 498 (1959). 
61 Id. at 513. 
62 Id. at 515. 
63 Id. at 514. 
64 404 u.s. 898 (1971). 
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denial partly because of his belief that neither the commercial form nor 
the commercial content of a publication make it less deserving of First 
Amendment protection. 65 He reasoned that speech directed at private 
economic decision making cannot be less important than political expres-
sion. "When immersed in a free flow of commercial information, private 
sector decision making is at least as effective an institution as are our 
various governments in furthering the social interest in obtaining the best 
general allocation of resources."66 While he does not doubt that an ad-
verse credit rating can cause injury, his position is that the injured party 
"can inform his suppliers and creditors that a report is misleading."67 
Justice Douglas may be alone in this view, but it has been suggested that 
his analysis and reasoning throw some doubt on the present vitality of 
Valentine. 68 
Finally; in 1973 in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on 
Civil Rights69 the Supreme Court upheld against First Amendment 
challenge an ordinance which had been interpreted as forbidding 
newspapers to allow employers "to place advertisements in the male 
or female columns, when the jobs advertised obviously do not have 
bona fide occupational qualifications or exceptions .... "70 The Court 
based its holding upon an application of the commercial speech doc-
trine first enunciated in Valentine. 11 However, the Court took pains to 
limit that doctrine, pointing out that under New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, not all advertisements are commercial speech. 72 "The critical 
feature of the advertisement in Valentine ... was that . . . it did no 
more than propose a commercial transaction .... "73 An advertise-
ment expressing an opinion on a public economic issue would be 
protected. 74 
The argument was made by petitioner newspaper in Pittsburgh Press 
that commercial speech should receive more protection than Valentine 
would suggest, on the basis that "the exchange of information is as 
important in the commercial realm as in any other."75 The Court re-
sponded: 
Whatever the merits of this contention may be in other contexts, it is 
unpersuasive in this case. Discrimination in employment is .. . illegal 
commercial activity under the Ordinance. We have no doubt that a 
65 ld. at 905. Justice Douglas also based his dissent on his belief that all libel actions 
are unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 899. 
66 Id. at 905. 
67 Id. at 906. 
68 Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25, 29 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 
U.S. 985 (1974). 
69 413 u.s. 376 (1973). 
70 Id. at 379. 
71 ld. at 384-89. 
72 Id. at 384. 
73 Id. at 385. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 388. 
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newspaper constitutionally could be forbidden to publish a want ad 
proposing a sale of narcotics . . . . . .. Any First Amendment in-
terest which might be served by advertising an ordinary commer-
cial proposal and which might arguably outweigh the governmen-
tal interest supporting the regulation is altogether absent when 
the commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction on adver-
tising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity. 76 
The Court thus chose to make its decision on the limited ground of 
illegality of what was being advertised, rather than by generally and 
broadly upholding Valentine without discussion, as it did in 
Cammarano. Therefore, while Valentine and the credit rating cases 
which depend on it have not yet been overruled, there may be room, 
given the language of the Court, for the inference that the commer-
cial speech doctrine may be due for reconsideration. Any such recon-
sideration may have as one of its results the afplication of Gertz to all 
libel actions and hence the total elimination o the damages aspect of 
Sharratt. 
MARION KATZ LITTMAN 
76 Id. at 388-89. 
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